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Margins and borders: polities and ethnicities in North-East India1 
Philippe RAMIREZ
in Joëlle Smadja (ed.) Territorial Changes and Territorial Restructurings in the Himalayas. Delhi, 
2013 under press. FINAL DRAFT, not to be quoted.
Both the affirmative action policies of  the Indian State and the demands of  ethno-
nationalist movements contribute to the ethnicization of  territories, a process which 
began in colonial times. The division on an ethnic basis of  the former province of  
Assam into States and Autonomous Districts2 has multiplied the internal borders and 
radically redefined the political balance between local communities. Indeed, cultural 
norms have been and are being imposed on these new territories for the sake of  the 
inseparability of  identity, culture and ancestral realms. The presence of  certain ethnic or 
cultural minorities has become problematic. States have come into conflict over ethnic-
minority enclaves in their respective territories. This underlines a major issue that we 
hope to document in the following pages through actual cases: does the ethnic 
balkanization of  the North-East correspond to the realization of  old sovereignties? Did 
pre-colonial North-East India look like an assemblage of  "tribal countries", each with a 
clear-cut territory, a homogenous culture and a unique ethnicity? 
These issues do indeed emerge if  one considers current data. In several communities 
in the North-East the strict correlation between culture and identity is far from being 
firmly established and the very question of  ethnic affiliation may not arise at all. It may 
be argued that migratory blending over recent years has blurred traditional settings. We 
will make the opposite assumption, suggesting that such social forms pertain to ancient 
social identities which attribute less importance to ethnicity. These phenomena will be 
illustrated using the case of  a hilly region divided between Assam and Meghalaya 
[Map 1]. 
1
 Most of  the field data presented in this article have been collected under ANR project “Language, Culture and Territory
in North-East India”. Thanks to Morningkeey Phangcho, Raktim Pator and Belinstone Khwait.
2 States of  Nagaland, Meghalaya, Manipur, Tripura, Mizoram. Autonomous Districts of  North-Cachar Hills and Karbi-
Anglong, Bodo Autonomous Council. On the history of  these successive divisions, see for example Baruah, 1999.
2Map 1: State and District Borders, 2009
3Four "tribes" historically coexist in this area: the Khasis, the Pnars (Jaintias, Syntengs), the Karbis (Mikirs) and the Tiwas
(Lalungs). All are listed as Scheduled Tribes in at least one of  the seven States of  North-East India. However, for each tribe,
the extent to which it obtains advantages associated with this status varies from State to State, and in Assam it furthermore 
depends on whether this involves plain or hill dwellers. Giving accurate figures about Scheduled Tribes might be a rather 
delicate issue, one of  the reasons being that they are often referred to using outdated terms which are rejected by the groups
in question. The problem is naturally more complex for non-scheduled tribes and sections. Nevertheless, the following 
estimates may be put forward for 2001 (official name between quotes; official Scheduled Tribes figures in bold): 
Meghalaya Assam Hills Assam Plains
"Khasi-Jaintia" 
(Khasi+Jaintia+Pnar)
1,100,000 13,000
"Mikir "(Karbi) 11,000 353,000 200,000
"Lalung" (Tiwa) 1,000 10,000 171,000
In order to roughly set the scene, it could be said that the Khasis, Pnars and Karbis 
constitute fairly distinct entities in particular areas – though not everywhere –to the west,
south and east respectively, where they have obtained "Autonomous districts" (Khasi 
Hills, Jaintia Hills, Karbi-Anglong); their population however extends well beyond these 
districts. As for the Tiwas, they largely coexist with the Khasis, the Karbis and the 
Assamese castes, the main group in the Plains. Now, cultural belonging as well as 
identities are far less clear-cut within a large region at the interface between these ethno-
linguistic areas. Here, often within the same village, one may come across speakers of  
different languages, different descent systems and barely expressed ethnic identities. We 
shall try to show how the atypical character of  these communities pertains to particular 
relationships between culture, territory and political affiliation in which ethnicity plays a 
minor role. 
It should be quite clear in the following pages that we consider the ethnic group as a 
real entity, exclusively founded however on identity assertions. Its limits are simply 
defined by the sum of  individuals who claim to belong to it.3 Indeed, many north-
eastern groups satisfy this definition: it does not imply that belonging to an ethnic group
is compulsory; and it does not imply that the representations associated with the ethnic 
groups are real.
Every winter, Jonbil Fair (Jonbil mela) is held 50 km east of  Guwahati. The Fair is 
famous among the Assamese for being one of  the last places where barter is found. The 
event takes place three days before Magh Bihu, a key event in the Assamese ritual year.4 
Jonbil mela is extremely rich in anthropological meaning. Our focus here will only be its 
geographical and political context. At certain times of  the day the mela looks rather like 
the usual, modern fair where neighbouring villagers come to purchase household goods 
and to have a ride on the merry-go-rounds. However, a number of  other activities take 
place, some of  them typical of  Magh bihu celebrations throughout Assam (collective 
fishing, cockfights), while others are more out of  the ordinary, like the famous barter. 
Hill-dwellers come to exchange edible roots (taro, turmeric, ginger...) for dried fish and 
3
This conception closely matches the one used by F. Barth (1970: 13-14): "To the extent that actors use ethnic identities 
to categorize themselves and others for purposes of  interaction, they form ethnic groups in this organizational sense".
4  Magh Bihu corresponds in other parts of  India to Makara Sankranti or Thai Pongal.
4sweet pancakes (ass. pitha), the typical delicacy eaten at Bihu. The reasons for this 
bartering are obviously ritualistic rather than economic, as most visitors would find the 
same products at a similar price on markets closer to home. What is taking place at Jonbil
mela might be the staging of  a time when such goods were at the very heart of  
exchanges between the hill people and the plain people.
The fair is sponsored by a local ruler, the Gobha Raja, nowadays considered to be the 
"King of  the Tiwas". However, it is neither strictly a State ritual nor a territorial ritual. It 
is neither essentially related to a single tribe, although the geographical setting of  the 
mela assigns a prominent role to the hosts, the Tiwas and the Gobha Raja. Visitors 
present the raja with various free contributions which are considered as “taxes” (kar). 
Not all of  them identify themselves as Tiwa and, as we shall see, their status of  “subject 
of  the raja is a matter of  interpretation. They originate from an area hardly definable in 
either ecological or administrative terms, straddling the borders of  Assam and 
Meghalaya, as well as the plains and hills. Neither do visitors to the mela seem to 
correspond to any clear cultural community: if  languages alone are to be taken into 
account, they are speakers of  Khasi, Tiwa, Karbi and Assamese. As for ethnicity, their 
heterogeneity is all the more puzzling, with some villagers even asserting no particular 
ethnic identity: when questioned about their "tribe", they give a clan name.
The ritual territory defined by the origin of  the barterers appears to be complex. How
do we go about uncovering part of  its foundations? We will first turn to the mythology 
and historical data related to Jonbil mela. We will then examine its visitors' villages of  
origin to check to what extent the heterogeneity of  the public attending the Fair does 
not simply reflect the anthropological heterogeneity of  the region. 
The political significance of  the Fair has evolved significantly over the last twenty 
years with the rise of  the Tiwa movement whose political and community bodies have 
become the true patrons of  the event.5 The symbolic characters staged nowadays are 
Gobha Raja, a number of  his own vassals, and the heir to the Ahom dynasty (svargadeu), 
which ruled over Assam. Everyone recalls that only a few years ago, the rajas of  Khyrim 
and Jaintia were also present at Gobha Raja's side. The reason for the visit by these two 
5 Jonbil mela is run by the Tiwa Literary Society (Tiwa Mathonlai Tokhra) and the Tiwa Autonomous Council. Demands 
for autonomy date back to 1967 under the auspices of  the Lalung Darbar. 
Fig 2: Hills and plains: roots (turmeric) 
exchanged for (dried) fish. Jonbil mela 
2004. (photo by Samiran Boruah)
5hill rulers is less obvious. Was it only a question of  diplomacy or simple courtesy? Local 
representations depict Gobha, Jaintia and Khyrim as much more than mere neighbours. 
A number of  narratives draw a triangle of  special relationships between them. 
A common story portrays the rajas of "Gobha, Jayata and Khoiram" (Gobha, Jaintia 
and Khyrim) as three brothers born on a mountain called "Thin Makhlang" or 
"Timophlang", the first from the ground, the second from a stone and the third from a 
hollow tree.6 Very few people in the plains know the exact location of  this place, but 
according to the inhabitants of  the Tiwa hills, it would be situated in Meghalaya, on the 
ancient border between the three States.7 Similar narratives show the three characters 
jumping out of  a pond. Gobha is sometimes the eldest, sometimes the youngest 
brother.8 In some instances, Jayata and Khoiram come to Jonbil mela to find the Bihu 
delicacy, pitha, in order to celebrate the corresponding festival in the hills, Rangsi.
Among Hill Tiwas, there are still traces of  meetings between Khyrim and Gobha 
kings. At Kutusi Mokoidharam, not far from 
the three borders, a set of  twelve monoliths 
stands right on the trail down from Nartiang 
(Jaintia hills)9. Some Hill Tiwas explain that 
when Raja Khrem (Khyrim) came to pay a visit 
to Gobha Raja, he used to stop at this place 
where a market was held. Such a narrative is in 
fact of  valuable historical importance in that it 
underlines the fundamental role of  trade in the 
former chieftainships. One may even argue that
the raison d'être of  these States was the 
protection of  trade and markets. It is well 
known that the Khasi States drew most of  their
revenue from market taxes (ka khrong ka dan)10 and most disputes between States, as well 
as with the British, concerned the control of  or access to markets.11 
The image of  chiefs coming and going over the hills to ensure the smooth running of
markets and of  them taking their share might give an idea of  the nature of  the Hill 
States. It is not at all clear whether very defined and close borders separated these chiefs’
"territories". The oral tradition itself  sometimes confuses various rulers: It is quite 
common to hear Tiwas speaking of  "Jotya-Khairam", i.e. "Jaintia-Khyrim", a generic 
term referring to the higher hills of  the plateau. And this pattern seems to have been 
used more widely than merely around Gobha. According to one of  the myths of  origin 
for neighbouring Dimoria, the latter's rajas are supposed to have descended from one of
6 Gogoi, 1986: 150. Several variants may be found with slightly different characters. One of  those we have recorded 
associate Gobha with Jayta-Khairam and Mylliem, a State founded in mid-eighteenth century.
7 Tini Mawphlang combines an Assamese term: "the 3" with a Khasi compound: "grass stone".
8 Singpal Sarma, Dainik Assam, 1994
9 There are actually more than twelve  monoliths. This arbitrary number may give an indication of  the political importance
of  the place. In the indigenous histories of  this part of  Asia, polities are often organized on a duodecimal basis. C f. 
Izikowitz (1962) on the Tai.
10 Gurdon, 1906: 67. According to Bareh (1967: 42), the collection of  these "trifling dues" was one of  the characteristics 
that distinguished the Khasi chief, the syiem, from the common people. In Sohra, markets were part of  princesses' 
dowries (Bareh, 1967: 86).
11 for example Syiemleh, 1989, p. 67.
Fig. 3: Mokoidharam, site of  an ancient market. 
(photo by Ph. Ramirez)
6four brothers: "Gubha, Dimorua, Khoiram and Milim", whose cradle was 
"Thimuflong". Another narrative published by Gohain conjures up for us the 
components of  the former political system.
“When the Khorang clan (Khoiram) of  the Jaintias wanted a bullock for their religious festival, they would go to the 
Magro clan of  the Lalungs living in the Jaintia habitat with a betel-nut and liquor [...] Next morning, the chief  [of  the 
Magro] would hand over a rope to them [...] They would go to the Gobha raja with liquor and a betel-nut and the latter 
would say, 'Go to the field and select a young bull'. [They used to pay] one rupee and four annas to the cowherd, but no 
price was to be paid for the bull”.12 
Proper nouns must not be taken for granted for they appear to confuse clans and 
States. Instead, it is the structural features which are noteworthy here. One rapidly 
perceives the social landscape of  this paradigmatic narrative: a network of  economic and
ritual relationships among clans, and between clans and States, which transcended the 
limits between hills and plains or even made possible exchanges between hills and plains.
This is in tune with the patterns above which focused on the association of  several 
chiefs all placed on the same footing. 
Historical documents about the region portray a less egalitarian and peaceful image of
the relationships between these three rulers. However, they confirm the existence of  a 
regional politico-economic system based on trade between the hills and plains. For three 
centuries, two major powers competed against each other in the area: the Ahom rulers, 
dominant in the plains, and the Jaintias controlling the eastern Meghalaya plateau. The 
region is mentioned in the Assamese chronicles (buranjii ) dating from the seventeenth 
century onwards. At that time, and until the advent of  British Rule in 1826, the Ahom 
sovereigns almost entirely controlled the Brahmaputra Valley, yet hardly any of  the 
highlands. They sent some military expeditions into the hills (1707 especially, in the 
Jaintia hills) but never occupied them. They nevertheless maintained multiple trade 
relationships with the hills and mountains, whether with Bhutan or Tibet, the Naga, 
Khasi or Garo Hills.13 As a matter of  fact, they entered a system and networks which 
pre-existed them long before. In this system, the "gates" leading to the hills, the duars, 
were much sought after strategic points.14 The duars themselves provided access to major
trade routes, but the nearby hills also concealed some resources valued by merchants 
from the plains, such as salt, lime, lac, wax ...15 Ahoms attempted to control the duars by 
gaining the allegiance of  local leaders, to whom they granted the status of  raja. In this 
venture, they competed with other States, namely Jaintia and Khyrim, which also claimed
suzerainty over the same chiefs.16 In the early eighteenth century, the affiliation of  the 
rulers of  Gobha, Neli and Khala shifted from one to the other. They seemed to have 
seldom been fully independent, but played on rivalries to protect themselves, possibly 
lending simultaneous allegiances to two or more suzerains.17 
When the British arrived on the scene, Khyrim and Jaintia had been in mutual conflict
12 Ibid. "Khorang", or Khoiram as Gohain notes, would not designate a "clan" but Khyrim State; similarly, Magro is a 
village on the border between the hills and plains.
13 Mackenzie (1884: 9-10), Blackburn (2003: 33-35), Baruah (2002: 442).
14 On the southern duars during British Rule, cf. Syiemleh, 1989: 9, 67.
15 See, for example, Pemberton, 1835: 215.
16 Hamilton 1807 (31-33) provided a list of  foothill States around Guwahati before British Rule.
17 Devi, 1960: 125, 130. 
7for several years, a situation which affected exchanges through Gobha.18 The image of  a 
peaceful coexistence between the three kings was nevertheless maintained, unless it 
actually only emerged afterwards. The intimacy among the three kings, which is tangible 
in the folk narratives, would reflect a very fluctuating situation in which the area fell 
either alternatively or simultaneously under the authority of  several States. In 1829, when
accounting for the difficulties in preparing a map of  the Khasi hills, David Scott 
provided a very significant clarification: "throughout these mountains peculiar spots are 
to be found belonging to one chief, although surrounded with the territory of  another, 
and that two or more of  them are occasionally found exercising authority in the same 
village."19 One point in particular must be stressed; the possibility that an area may have 
been simultaneously subjected to several authorities. It could have led to an 
intermingling of  different cultural models imposed or inspired by the respective elites of
the dominant States.
The region where the three rajas mingled roughly consists of  the north-eastern corner
of  the Meghalaya plateau: low hills (200-800 m) covered mainly by slash and burn 
regrowth vegetation and bamboo groves. To the west and south lies Meghalaya. 
Formerly part of  Assam, this Indian State was created in 1972 for the benefit of  Garo 
and Khasi-Jaintia Scheduled Tribes (ST). Except for its capital Shillong, the whole State 
is classified as a "Tribal area" under the 6th Schedule of  the Indian Constitution. The task
of  settling customary affairs, as well as a section of  local government, has been handed 
over to three Autonomous District Councils: Garo Hills, Khasi Hills and Jaintia Hills. To
the East lies the State of  Assam, and more precisely the Karbi-Anglong Autonomous 
District (1970), realm of  the Karbi ST, under the same 6th Schedule. To the North, the 
plains of  Assam, which on this side do not include any official "Tribal area", but where 
the Tiwa (plain) ST demands its own Autonomous District.20 
This territorial arrangement stems from a series of  processes initiated on the arrival of  
the British and which today continue along the same lines.21 The conviction among 
numerous observers is that these political territories no doubt correspond to ancient 
territories inhabited "from the beginning" by stable, well defined and unique 
populations. It is unclear whether such a representation existed in pre-colonial times, but
it seems just as firmly rooted among the ethno-nationalist elites as it was among British 
rulers. Thus, the oriental part of  Meghalaya, known since colonial times as the "Khasi 
and Jaintia hills", is believed to be the ancestral territory of  the Khasis and Jaintias. 
Associated with the image of  a specific ethnic territory is that of  a homogenous 
population. Today this perception is dominant among people claiming a Khasi and/or 
Pnar identity. Certainly, the Khasis do acknowledge some cultural differences among 
themselves. The most common classification recognizes four localized groups: in the 
highlands, the Khynriam, to the south the War, to the east the Pnar and on the northern 
18 Pemberton, 1835: 221.
19 Phillimore, 1954, p. 52.
20 In Assam there are 23 STs, two Autonomous Districts, 6 Tribal Autonomous Councils and the new Bodoland Territorial
Area Districts. Meghalaya has 17 STs and three Autonomous Districts. The administrative settings are not, however, 
entirely similar in both States. Contrary to the Autonomous District, the Tribal Autonomous Council does not rule any 
particular territory and does not fall under the Constitution of  India. 
21 Current tribal areas roughly correspond to the "Partially excluded areas" established by the Government of  India Act, 
1935, chap V.
8and eastern fringes, the Bhoi. However, for a majority of  the first two groups, there is no
doubt about their original unity.22 They are all thought to descend from the "Seven huts"
(Hynniew trep). Among certain ethno-nationalists, the mere evocation of  differences 
among the Khasis is perceived as an unacceptable attack on the unity of  the group.23 
Among the Pnars and the Bhois, the matter is more a subject of  debate, although the 
Khasi identity is widely accepted.
As early as the beginning of  the twentieth century, Gurdon – author of  the first 
monography on the Khasis – portrayed a very ambiguous image of  the northern-belt 
people, whom the "other Khasis" called "Bhoi" and considered with some disdain. 
Gurdon claimed they were mostly Mikir – these days the common designation for Karbi
– and that the term Bhoi was “a territorial name rather than tribal”.24 Several decades 
later, despite the area opening on to the outside, Bhoi's specificity does not seem to have
diminished. It was formally recognized in 1992 with the creation of  Ri-Bhoi district (lit. 
"Bhoi country"). The recent attempt to rechristen it "Northern Khasi District" and the 
strong reaction which ensued prove that a century later the classification of  Bhois as 
Khasis remains problematic, both for external observers and the Bhois themselves.25
Let us consider the north-eastern corner of  the Meghalaya plateau. The 
anthropological complexity of  this area makes any description arduous. Cultural, 
linguistic and ethnic diversity is not only widespread, but neither does it assume the same
aspect nor does it appear to the same degree everywhere. A comparison of  two zones 
might be made. In the first zone, villages are generally monolingual and mono-ethnic. In 
the other, several languages are spoken in the same village and ethnic identities are either
complex or barely determined. On the one hand a compartmentalized mosaïc, on the 
other a continuum of  blends. (cf. map)
22 A famous saying, the origin and age of  which is not known, is frequently quoted to support this vision: u khynriam, u 
pnar, u bhoi, u war ki dei u paid khasi ba iar : "Khyriam, Pnar, Bhoi, War, all belong to the large Khasi group".
23 Such a stand is not limited to the Khasi elites. For a discussion on similar representations among the Garos, see Burlings 
2007.
24 Gurdon, 1906, p.4.
25 In 2004, the very powerful Khasi Students' Union demanded that the district be renamed "North Khasi hills", claiming 
that the term Bhoi was derogatory. The Confederation of  Ri-Bhoi People (CORP) successfully opposed this attempt, 
arguing that the locals had always been referred to in this way and in provocation they retorted that the name of  the 
State itself  should be changed, since Meghalaya is a "foreign" name ("Abode of  the clouds" in Sanskrit). "North Khasi 
Hills" is still used by the KSU.
9Illustration 4: Multiethnicity in sample villages of  Meghalaya-Assam border (© Ph. Ramirez, 
CNRS)
10
We do not intend to go into the reasons for these differences which may have been 
shaped by the interplay of  Christianisation and Scheduled Tribe policies.26 Suffice to say 
that, in some parts, the limit between the two zones follows the border between Ri-Bhoi 
and Karbi-Anglong, i.e. between Meghalaya and Assam. Thus, in this area, the Assam-
Meghalaya border neither corresponds to a limit between two ethnic territories, nor two 
mono-cultural areas, but between different types of  heterogeneity. We will presently 
consider the first zone, the east of  Ri-Bhoi district. Here, the linguistic landscape is more
multicoloured than in other parts of  Meghalaya. Although the local dialect of  Khasi, 
Bhoi Khasi,27 prevails both as the mother tongue and lingua franca, Karbi and Tiwa are 
spoken in some fifteen villages, to which one must add an atypical Assamese parlance 
used ironically not on the Assamese border but well inside the hills, in the Marngar 
locality. One must bear in mind that these languages belong to three entirely distinct 
families: Mon-Khmer (Khasi), Tibeto-Burmese (Tiwa, Karbi) and Indo-Aryan 
(Assamese). 
Similarly, clanic affiliations are also more complex than elsewhere in Meghalaya, a fact 
that has a very significant impact on ethnic identity. As in many parts of  India, ascribed 
identity is most generally a result of  the perception of  patronyms, or "titles". In tribal 
systems, these correspond to clans or to local clan segments. The general paradigm in 
North-East India is that a particular title indicates one and only one ethnic affiliation. 
This is not the case, however, in the area we are dealing with, where the ethnic 
connotation of  names varies according to several factors, depending on the informant 
and the local or social context in which information is given. Thus, the same group 
might be referred to as either Bhoi, Khasi, Khasi-Bhoi, Karbi or Tiwa. The most 
interesting cases are provided by multiform titles: for example, people called Umbah in 
Meghalaya and those called Puma in Assam, see themselves as one and the same. Along 
the Assam-Meghalaya border, they assume several identities, sometimes in a combined 
manner. In Assam they introduce themselves as Tiwas, in Meghalaya either as Bhois or 
Khasis, and sometimes Lalungs.28 By contrast, the Assamese Tiwas living some distance 
from the border claim that the Umbah are exclusively Tiwa; similarly the "mainland" 
Khasis might insist that the same Umbah are "pure Khasis" instead. And this is only one
example among many others.
26 See Ramirez, 2009, for examples of  cultural diversity in the area. 
27 Bhoi Khasi differs from standard Khasi (i.e. Cherra Khasi) mainly in the position of  the verb which is situated before 
the subject. For more on this dialect, see Nagaraja, 1993.
28 “Lalung” is now perceived as derogatory by the Tiwas in Assam, although it is generally not the case in Meghalaya.
11
Illustration 5: Fig. 5: Borders, spellings and identity: the example of  Puma (red) versus Umbah (green), 
Meghalaya and Assam Electoral Rolls, 2006.
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Might one further qualify the inter-State border, in this particular area, by suggesting 
that it corresponds far less to a real cultural break or gap than to a transition between 
two ways of  perceiving the intermediate groups? Dominant perceptions would impose a 
clear break where cultural variations are elusive. As we shall see, this would be accurate 
only if  two further details were provided. Firstly, it seems that the cultural variations in 
question do not evolve in a linear way along a continuum, but through a mosaic of  
micro breaks. Secondly it must be stressed that dwellers in the border zones do not 
adhere easily to the dual categorizations emanating from the politico-ethnic centres.
The fundamental social unit in this part of  Ri-Bhoi, as in the entire Khasi Hills 
Autonomous District, is a community of  villages called raid. This administrative unit is 
part of  the "traditional" political system in force within the Autonomous District: the 
States, hima, under the authority of  a kingly person, syiem, are divided into a number of  
raids. Raids are ruled by representatives of  clans, basan, and in Ri-Bhoi they are presided 
over either by a vassal chief  called syiem raid or a lyngdoh priest. However old and 
whatever the origin of  its inhabitants, the raid is one of  the main references in social 
identity. Every raid formerly came under the authority of  the Tiger-god Ryngku (Khla 
Ryngkhu) who punished crimes and to whom an annual sacrifice was offered. According
to the syiem of  Khyrim, all the raids in north-eastern Ri-Bhoi placed themselves willingly 
under his predecessors’ authority in order to seek protection from the Jaintia tyranny.29 
As a matter of  fact, it seems that Jaintias occupied the region several times during the 
seventeenth and nineteenth centuries. When the British arrived, it was under Shyllong 
and when the latter split a few years later (1853), the local raids were divided up between 
Mylliem and Khyrim along a line running north-south. 
The present raids display several attributes of  modern administrative units, including a
delineated territory. However, one might question how long this form has actually been 
in existence. The raid should be compared with other comparable institutions in the 
vicinity. In Karbi-Anglong, whether in the Karbi-speaking or Tiwa-speaking areas, some 
politico-ritual networks are found to be spatially discontinuous (see infra). In other 
words, the sum of  links between a centre and its dependencies does not form a 
continuous spatial entity but rather a network interlaced with other similar networks. We 
suggest that this open and discontinuous pattern is older than the form the raids display 
nowadays. The Khasi hill raids, which remained real political bodies, would have been 
"territorialized" under the effect of  modern administrative models. On the contrary, in 
the parts directly annexed to Assam in 1835, in which Karbi-Anglong falls, the same type
of  polities, deprived of  their political functions would have kept the original 
morphology. 
Nongkhap, or Nukhap raid (pop. 1700 in 2001) in north-eastern Ri-Bhoi is attached 
to Khyrim. It is fairly representative of  the multiethnic village zones of  Ri-Bhoi and 
more precisely of  those that maintain close links with Assam. The etymology of  
"Nukhap" is very significant in this respect: khap is a Khasi term meaning "border", nu 
means "new" in Assamese. According to a local account, Nukhap remained uninhabited 
29 Interview with Syiem Khyrim, Feb. 2006. The date is not remembered exactly, but it must be remembered that it was 
before the partition of  Shyllong, i.e. before 1853.
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up until "300-400 years ago", before immigrants arrived from Assam and placed 
themselves under the protection of  Syiem Khyrim. Why did they come? It is said that 
the first inhabitants were Karbi and that they reached Nukhap while fleeing "the Bodo 
king of  the plains".30 According to the head-priest (lyngdoh), his own family arrived from 
the Jaintia hills in 1618 after the Jaintias had overcome a "local tribe". Another informant
described migration to Nukhap as a return to their origins: "We are people from the 
hills. We couldn't stay any longer in the plains". Without going into detail, it is 
worthwhile noting that such an association between tribal identity and the hills is gaining
momentum in North-East India, while a large majority of  tribals live in the plains.
In keeping with a widespread model in Meghalaya, the existing villages of  Nukhap claim 
to have come from a common founding village, Nongbah (Kh. "great village").31 From 
Nongbah Nukhap came the founders of  the raid's four villages. They were met by 
immigrants from Tiwa-speaking villages situated on the Assamese side. Nongbah 
Nukhap was finally abandoned after "the conversion". The raid experienced large-scale 
Christianisation in the first half  of  the twentieth century.32 All villages are now 
exclusively Presbyterian or Catholic. Following an initial period, when Christians were 
expelled from villages and regrouped, the remaining "pagans" (jyntir) had to choose in 
turn between conversion and exile. Beside the distribution of  settlements, conversion 
had an obvious impact on culture and ethnicity. The influence of  catechists preaching in 
the Khasi language and using Khasi books might have been decisive. Culturally, 
Christianisation might have taken the same path as a large movement of  "Khasi-isation" 
generated by other factors such as the creation of  Meghalaya and mass schooling. It 
might not be a generalised phenomenon in Ri-Bhoi, but in Nukhap the linguistic 
situation has evolved significantly over the last two generations. Bhoi Khasi has now 
become the only mother tongue, even though twenty years ago Karbi and Tiwa were still
spoken in some houses. Today, these languages are understood nowhere in this raid. By 
contrast, just a couple of  kilometres to the East, still within Meghalaya, in a fringe 
devoid of  roads and teachers, Tiwa is the only language known to everyone. 
In Nukhap, Khasi-Assamese bilingualism is associated with exchanges both upstream 
and downstream. Though a dependency of  Khyrim, the largest Khasi State, Nukhap 
seems to be much more oriented towards Assam than Meghalaya. People only go to the 
district headquarters, Nongpoh, to settle administrative matters. Before the Jagiroad-
Umsning road had been built (1975), villagers used to exclusively venture to markets in 
the Brahmaputra Valley: to Tapatuli and Jagiroad for rice and areca nuts, and once a year 
to Jonbil mela to barter roots for fish. Today, after each monsoon, Nukhap people still go 
down to Hariaburi, famous for its dried fish that keep a long time. 
In border communities naturally turned towards the plains, the creation of  Meghalaya 
has paradoxically weakened the links with Khasi States. The syiems had an obvious 
economic interest in the hill-plain borders: they used to exploit forest resources and to 
collect taxes on markets in the foothills, both through the local agents they appointed. 
The complete closure of  forests and the drawing of  a new boundary, together with the 
30 According to present-day knowledge, the Bodo, although the largest tribe in the plains, have never formed any State, at 
least under this designation. "Bodo king" might refer either to a Koch or Dimasa/Kachari ruler.
31 Nongbah's are root villages but not always the very first settlements. They are often ritual sites.
32 Most conversions took place between 1910 and 1960.
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building of  inner roads have noticeably reduced the Upland States' business 
opportunities in this area, land tax being non-existent in the Khasi hills. Thus, the little 
we know of  Nukhap's history tells us mostly about outside contributions and exchanges.
The main feature which distinguishes the Bhoi raids from both Assam and the Upper 
country is the feeble assertion of  any ethnic belonging. Nukhap inhabitants are hardly 
expansive on this topic. The label "Bhoi" is accepted by everyone. This acceptance may 
be a recent phenomenon, because in the early twentieth century the term was deemed 
pejorative in the eyes of  the Bhois themselves and later remained a synonym of  
"ignorant" in the Khasi language.33 More than elsewhere, the social context of  speech is 
the decisive factor in assessing identity: when speaking with a Khasi speaker from the 
Upper country one calls oneself  "Khasi Bhoi". On meeting an Assamese person, Karbi 
or Tiwa origins will be stressed instead. And "Bhoi" seems to be the name favoured 
when dealing with foreign anthropologists. There is no hidden strategy behind such 
opportunism. It truly reflects the social representations, which in this area are 
characterised by the conjunction of  multiple ethnic affiliations. In Nukhap, social 
identity could be summarised in the following manner: one belongs first to a raid, within 
which one's original ethnic belonging is still remembered, yet not deliberately displayed. 
In the raid, language and customs are fairly uniform and are linked at the upper level to a
large entity, "Bhoi", which is primarily defined by stressing the differences with the 
"Khasis", i.e. the "other Khasis": Khynriams, Pnars and Wars. On the other hand, 
cultural dissimilarities with groups residing in Assam, which are objectively more 
obvious, are not often pointed out. The reason might be that the scene on which ethnic 
identity is of  relevance for the people of  Ri-Bhoi is first of  all Meghalaya, to which 
political belonging is widely assumed; in this respect cultural differences with Assam are 
not problematic. Finally, belonging to a traditional State (hima), be it Khyrim or Mylliem, 
does not seem to correspond to any sense of  identity, and this seems the case in the 
larger part of  the Khasi hills.
The anthropological features of  Nukhap are typical of  many but not all raids. To the 
north, the border raids are, like Assam itself, compartmentalised into villages or hamlets 
asserting a single identity: "Khasi", "Karbi" or "Tiwa" – but not "Bhoi", as far as we 
know. Often, but not always, the original languages have survived with the Bhoi 
language. Here we reach the historical fringes between the highland and plain States, 
where political allegiances have been complex. In Mylliem State for example, the 
geographical specificity of  this belt has been acknowledged, and is still recognized by the
Khasi Autonomous Council. According to law,34 Mylliem is divided into two parts: the 
"Highlands" (ri-lum: "land of  the hills") and the "Lowlands" (ri-them), which come under 
different administrative structures. In Ri-Bhoi, the Lowlands are distributed among 
sixteen chiefs: three lyngdoh raids, eight syiem raids and five bangthe raids, each recruited 
from a particular clan. Two of  the syiems are entitled "syiem kuba", which might well refer 
to the family of  the Gobha raja, considered nowadays in Assam to be the "Tiwa king". 
One of  the raids, Marngar, forms a linguistic isolate surrounded by entire Khasi and 
33 Cf. the dictionary edited by Nissor Singh, 1906: 11.
34 Cf. Law passed by the Khasi Autonomous District Council in 2007: "Appointment and Succession of  Syiem.Mylliem".
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Karbi-speaking zones, where a very peculiar form of  Assamese is used.35 Local people 
also assert a peculiar identity, both Khasi and Marngar, this latter ethnonym being found 
exclusively in these nine villages. Finally, the "bongthe raids" are specific to Mylliem State. 
Bongthe or bangthe is the Karbi term for "big man", "chief". In Mylliem, the clans into 
which bongthe are recruited have Karbi-sounding titles: Rongchon, Rongpei, Teron, 
Timung.
The five bongthe raids lie adjacent to Dimoria Kingdom, a foothill State sought after for
decades by the Jaintias, the Khasi States and the Ahoms. It is now within the formal 
borders of  Assam and its chiefs claim to be Karbi. The issue of  sovereignty over 
Dimoria is not part of  the several litigations between Assam and Meghalaya, but 
"Dumria" is however still mentioned in the official list of  syiem raids under Mylliem.36 
Moreover, the Khasi collective memory recalls the Khad âr bongthai, the "Twelve 
bongthai" confiscated by the British, never restored and still in Assam.37 Conversely, 
parts of  Mylliem's raids are still considered by the Dimoria Raja to be his own tributaries.
One example is Marmain, or Marme as pronounced in Karbi.38 All inhabitants of  
Marme bear titles generally identified as Karbi. The Karbi language is still widely used, 
although in sharp competition with Khasi and Bhoi . Most inhabitants are Christian. It is
unquestionably the Karbi identity that dominates here, at least nowadays. People claim to
be "Dumrali karbi", literally "Karbi of  Dimoria", the generic designation for Karbis 
from the plains. Almost no reference is made to the Bhoi identity. According to Marme 
leaders, who are particularly active in promoting the Karbi cause in Meghalaya, the 
locality was previously part of  Dimoria, which was only recently annexed to Mylliem and
thus to Meghalaya. Thus, in contrast to other raids with a Karbi component – Nukhap 
for example – which have adopted a Bhoi identity, Marme still perceives itself  as a 
subset of  a vanished polity. The creation of  the Assam-Meghalaya border, far from 
severing the link with Dimoria, would have generated a nostalgic sense of  belonging.
Culturally, Marme comes across as a transition between the Khasi-speaking hills and 
the Kamrupi Karbi-speaking parts of  the Assam plains.39 The transition, however, can 
be said to consist of  one other component at least, if  not more. Less than an hour's 
walk north of  Marme, the Assam border runs through a village, Markhang, made up of  
45 houses. The inhabitants bear Karbi titles of  the kind found in Marme, but do not 
spontaneously assert a Karbi identity. They speak a Kamrupi Karbi with a heavily 
Assamized lexicon. Their main collective ritual has a rather Hindu feel about it: it is a 
sacrifice to "Mahadev, Kamika and Rongsundi".40 Interestingly, Marme people, although 
all Christian, believe that those of  Markhang have lost their Karbi identity. 
The history of  Markhang is narrated as a double migration: firstly "following a Gobha
prince" down from modern Karbi-Anglong to the plains and then up to Marngar in the 
Khasi hills; secondly from Marngar back to the present location in the plains. This route 
35 See Ramirez 2009.
36  KHADC, op.cit.
37 Cf. Syiemlieh, 1989: 67. In 1830 the "Rajah of  Khyrim" relinquished "his former claims on the boundary of  Desh 
Doomorooah", but was assigned some land near Sonapur market for trading: Aitchinson, 1931: 131.
38 See Ramirez, 2009.
39 Kamrupi Karbi refers to the Karbi dialects spoken in the plains.
40 Mahadev is a name for Siva, Kamika might well be Kamakhya, the most famous Goddess in Assam, and Rongsundi 
literally means "healing" in Assamese.
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involved settling in rather different natural environments, which is not at all exceptional 
in the stories of  origins we have collected. There are many reasons for these comings 
and goings. We will evoke some of  them below. In a regional context of  high mobility, 
the plain villages bordering the hills, such as Markhang, have been particularly exposed 
to countless ebbs and flows, whether in terms of  population, political sovereignty or 
ethnic identity. 
Lokkikok is a Tiwa-speaking village in Assam situated only 10 km from Markhang, in 
a similar geographic setup. This is how villagers narrate their arrival:
"We came down from Murji Kunji, near Marjong in the hills, to search for land. We settled first in Jagiroad Deosal, then 
in Lokkikok in 1942. The place had been inhabited by Karbis. They had stolen and shared among themselves the buffaloes 
belonging to the Dimoria King. A woman, angry about not getting a share, went to the king, who cursed and expelled them. 
They left after cursing the place and settled in Belkhuri, 2 km downstream. When we arrived in the area looking for a 
possible site, one of  the Karbis showed us Lokkikok. At first we suffered from numerous diseases. We finally found out that
a local spirit was responsible, the Tortoise Eater Lord (Kaso Khua Gohain). A cult was established and the troubles 
stopped".
These few words sum up the common historical aspects of  the peopling of  this 
region: shifting cultivation, political conflicts, morbidity, setting up of  new cults and 
moves from the hills to the plains. Only banishment for incest is missing here. The route
taken starts from Marjong, in the Tiwa hills, then makes a first stop at the most 
important Tiwa shrine in the plains, Deosal, near Gobha, and next, in a very typical 
move, runs along the foothills for 20 km to Lokkikok. This narrative somehow 
completes the route of  the Gobha outbound migrations depicted by the Markhang and 
Marngar people. It illustrates the plains-to-hills migrations, which are seldom evoked in 
literature. We have come across several such moves, which took place at the turn of  the 
twentieth century. Though this might be an ancient and regular phenomenon, let us try 
to determine what might have been its context in the late nineteenth century. 
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Illustration 6: examples of  migrations to northern Bhoi in the nineteenth century (the
colours of  arrows refer to different narratives). (© Ph. Ramirez, CNRS)
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In the nineteenth century, slash and burn was the sole method of  farming in northern
Meghalaya.41 Yet amazingly, the need for land is rarely mentioned as a factor of  
migration in local histories. Either land was plentiful enough to avoid moving villages, or
the practice was regular enough not to be specially noticed. Another factor which 
immediately comes to mind because regularly mentioned in the Assamese chronicles is 
epidemics. The scale of  some pandemics was such that it certainly had a decisive impact 
on the demographic map of  Middle Assam and Khasi-Janitia hills. However, given the 
present state of  knowledge, the effects are still difficult to assess, at least in the case of  
plains-to-hills migrations. Assam was hit for several consecutive years between 1890 and 
1903 by an outbreak of  kala azar (leishmaniasis), which is endemic in North-East India.42
Documented in the Garo hills since 1869, it broke out in Kamrup and Nowgong 
districts in 1888 and 1897. At the same period, the area was hit by a smallpox (1898) and 
cholera (1900) epidemic.43 Finally, the earthquake of  12th June 1897 further weakened 
the public health situation and resulted, moreover, in vast areas of  arable land being 
covered by sand.44 
Between 1891 and 1901, the total population of  the Assam plains grew from 2.6 to 
2.7 million (+6%). Yet the population declined sharply in the districts of  central Assam: 
Kamrup lost 45,000 inhabitants (-7%), and Nowgong 86,000 (-25%) which, for these 
two districts, meant a total deficit of  over 250,000 lives. The plains localities next to Ri-
Bhoi (Nij Teteliya, Gobha, Mayong, Raha) lost around 40% of  their population.45 The 
lower hills were also affected: Duar Amla (-14%), Rangkang-Nomati (-33%). Thus, at 
least a third of  Nowgong district's population either died or fled.46 No district in India 
had ever experienced such losses in the great epidemics of  the late nineteenth century, 
not even during the plague of  1896-97. Where did the survivors flee to? Large 
displacements occurred towards Upper Assam and the North Bank (Sibsagar, 
41 Chattopadhyay 1988: 59; Gurdon 1914: 40.
42 Until the invention of  treatment in 1922, kala azar mortality stood at 95%. (Sanyal 1982).
43 Allen 1905: 214-215; Allen 1902a: 23-24.
44 The 1897 earthquake provoked internal migration within the hills. Nakane (1967: 112) gives some examples for southern
Meghalaya.
45 Census of  India (Allen 1902b).
46 It is not easy to determine whether certain groups were more affected than others. The Tiwas (Lalungs), who live mainly
in the area hit by kala azar, definitely show a noticeable decline (52,000 to 32,000) but according to Allen (1902a: 82), 
part of  them might have converted to Koch.
Illustration 7: a sandfly of  the
phlebotomus genus, the vector of
leishmania (Wikimedia Commons)
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Lakhimpur, Darrang). The Khasi hills seem to have been relatively less affected, since 
their population was still on the rise during that period (6-7%). However, the Census 
does not reveal any significant move between the plains and the hills. If  migrations did 
take place, either they were not on a massive scale or they were only temporary. 
Moreover, the great pandemics of  the late nineteenth century did not entirely spare the 
hills.47 Thus, while this particular outbreak of  kala azar emptied the foothills of  their 
population, it does not seem to have generated significant waves of  migration towards 
present-day Ri-Bhoi. At least this is not obvious in the statistical data available. Yet, what
can been assessed is the size of  such phenomena, and we can imagine that at other 
periods of  time they were more marked, as in 1834-35, when most villages in the Karbi 
hills had to move.48
The relationship between ritual practices and migrations is rather unexpected. 
According to certain indigenous accounts, the abolishment of  certain ritual practices has
made survival impossible in some localities. Soon after Independence, the Assamese 
police were ordered to do away with human sacrifices in the former "excluded" zones in 
which the British did not apply the general law. This was the case of  Sonaikuchi. Some 
villagers offered goats instead, others ceased to worship. Mysterious deaths started to 
occur and were attributed to the wrath of  the local gods. Some families, terrified, fled to 
the Bhoi hills. 
Finally, one of  the major causes of  migrations has obviously been the development 
and decline of  economic opportunities. Two particular cases may be mentioned: in the 
early twentieth century, hundreds of  families came down from the Jaintia hills, attracted 
by recent developments involving lac cultivation and trade. Most of  them left when the 
prices collapsed after the Second World War. Similarly, in the early twentieth century, 
thousands of  Nepali settled in Meghalaya, including Ri-Bhoi, where they specialised in 
milk production. They have almost disappeared from the Khasi hills since the 
xenophobic riots of  1987. 49
The spatial mobility of  Bhoi groups must be put into some perspective along with 
some features of  their social structures. The potential of  these local polities (villages or 
raids) to integrate newcomers, whatever their culture, resides in their structure. The Ri-
Bhoi raids are governed by rules common to all Khasi hills, though we will not go into 
detail here.50 Many parallels with other political systems in Assam may also be drawn. 
The raid is first of  all an association of  local lineages, kpoh, which reside in a number of  
villages that have broken away from a "great village", nongbah. Each village has a chief  
(rongbah shnong), elected by the village assembly (darbar shnong). But at the raid level, 
authority is vested in the basans, who are the representatives of  the lineages, mostly the 
founding lineages. Yet the system is flexible enough to accommodate late settlers as well.
In Ri-Bhoi, there is no formal distinction between first and new settlers, as in some 
47 In 1898-99, the hills particularly suffered from a high mortality rate attributed to the great 1897 earthquake. (Allen 
1902a: 24; 1906: 56-57).
48 Hunter 1879 II: 189.
49 The Census of  India 1931 (Mullan 1932: 265) counts 6,932 Nepalese in the Khasi States with an increase of  2,939 since 
the 1921 Census. 
50 See Gurdon 1907: 68-75, Bareh 1967: 39ff.; Nongkynrih (2002: 66-88) gives a detailed description of  the local political 
setup. For the Jaintia political apparatus, see Gassah 1998.
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other areas of  Meghalaya.51 The basan assembly is based on an organic structure where 
each lineage is hereditarily assigned an administrative position. In some raids, the basans 
delegate government tasks to a territorial priest, the lyngdoh, or to a lower level syiem, the 
syiem raid.
Now, in Ri-Bhoi the rules for admission into the raid and its assembly do not take into
account ethnic affiliation. Rights are defined by belonging to lineages, on the basis of  
patronymics. Thus, the assembly of  Nukhap raid consists of  twelve basans from nine 
lineages, out of  which seven bear names commonly considered to be Karbi (e.g. 
Phanchu/Phangcho) or Tiwa (e.g. Umbah/Puma). In any case, whatever the ethnic 
group villagers associate with these names, this will not challenge the legitimacy of  the 
bearers to reside in the raid. 
Similarly, ethnic or cultural differences do not preclude matrimonial relationships. 
Interethnic marriages are almost totally absent from anthropological literature on the 
region. This might not be a very ancient practice but it is now widespread, at least in Ri-
Bhoi, Morigaon and West Karbi-Anglong. It seems that interethnic alliances are quite 
common in North-East India and are associated with a widening of  local matrimonial 
networks. In Northern Ri-Bhoi, village endogamy and raid endogamy still prevail, as is 
the case throughout the Khasi hills.52 This is, not however, incompatible with interethnic 
unions. In strictly matrilineal and matrilocal communities, as among Upland Khasis, any 
"trace" of  external husbands disappears, since their titles are not passed down to the 
next generation, and the situation is similar with wives’ titles among patrilineal and 
patrilocal groups. In Ri-Bhoi however, where both descent and residence systems coexist
– we shall come back to this later – village endogamy may perpetuate among lineages of  
different ethnic affiliations. In certain areas, such as Raid Nukhap, there have been so 
many mixed unions, that it is difficult to decide what should be retained as an 
"interethnic marriage". This, incidentally, is of  no relevance in this society, since the 
limits of  permitted unions are mostly those of  the "tribal" category: any "tribal" may be 
a possible match. This rule seems to be increasingly common in North-East India and 
might be the sign of  the genesis of  a "meta-tribe".
How are descent systems compatible with these interethnic marriages, when they 
bring together patrilineal and matrilineal families? As a matter of  fact, this opposition 
seems to be largely inaccurate in Ri-Bhoi and the Tiwa hills. In 1905’s Nowgong 
Gazetteer, B.C. Allen commented a Lalung (Tiwa) narrative, found in the Ahom 
chronicles53 and still common today, depicting the Lalungs "as moving back from the 
hills into the plains, as they disliked the ruling of  the Khasi chiefs that inheritance should
go to through the female line."54 Allen was obviously amazed on hearing the story and 
pointed out that "their own rules of  inheritance are, however, strange. A woman may 
either enter her husband's clan or the husband may enter that of  the wife, but all 
property and children of  the marriage belong to the clan which was adopted at the time 
of  the wedding". This could apply today not only to the Hill Tiwas but also to all the 
51 Nongkynrih (2002: 69-71) points out that in several villages of  the Sohra region, access to village positions was restricted
to the "founders" (nongseng shnong), as opposed to the newcomers (shongthap: lit. temporary settlers).
52 Nakane, 1967: 113-114.
53  Bhuyan 1932: 228.
54 Allen, 1905: 83.
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Bhois. It is rather surprising that we still retain matrilineality as the main feature of  both 
Khasi and Hill Tiwa societies without introducing regional nuances. If  it is true that 
most Khasi speakers in the Khasi hills and most Tiwa speakers are matrilineal, it is not 
the case among the Bhois, who explain that "one inherits one's mother's name when 
born in her house and one's father's name when born in his house". In other words, 
descent does not come first and, moreover, does not depend on ethnicity. It is the choice
of  residence which determines the transfer of  a title, positions and properties. 
Moreover, the choice of  residence is not imposed by a fixed social rule, but depends on 
the will of  the families concerned, according to their obligations and preferences. It is 
obvious that such a principle does not prevent the coexistence of  two descent modes in 
the same house, a case for which we have plenty of  illustrations.
Chie Nakane's work on Khasi and Garo matrilineality55 does not mention the 
possibility of  patrilocality or the possibility that residence determines descent. Current 
Khasi customary law places matrilineality at the heart of  Khasi identity and this has had 
very practical consequences: in 2008, Waibha Kyndiah, a politician and ironically the son 
of  the Minister of  Tribal Affairs, had to withdraw from the local elections after his 
Khasi status was withdrawn by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council. The 
reason was that he did not use his mother's name.56 However, the same KHADC law 
does, “under certain conditions”, allow for the quality of  Khasi to be passed down from 
father to son, either keeping the father's name or adopting a new clan name; these 
conditions specify, among others, that father and son "observe and are governed by 
Khasi matrilineal system of  lineage...".57 If  we consider the effective practices, regional 
distinctions need to be made. In the Khynriam and War zones, matrilineality is obviously
of  structural importance, reflected in the fundamental figure of  the grandmother as well
as in the roles of  elder sisters and maternal uncles. In the Jaintia hills, matrilineality is not
associated with matrilocality but with natalocality instead, since after marriage husband 
and wife remain in their respective mother's home.58 Nevertheless, these differences do 
not prevent immigrants from the Khynriam zone or Jaintia hills from easily adapting to 
Bhoi's descent system. This may be facilitated by two social constants in the Khasi hills: 
a strong fissionary tendency and a short genealogical memory.59
Although Ri-Bhoi falls under KHADC authority, and although the Tiwa hills had 
been under Jaintia's authority before British rule, in both these areas matrilineality is a 
tendency, not an absolute principle. If  we postulate that in Ri-Bhoi and the Tiwa hills, 
descent is determined neither by culture nor by ethnicity, but by residence, then it is 
much easier to understand how patrilineality and matrilineality may be combined. We 
suggest considering that these societies follow ambilineal descent. Ambilineality may 
have emerged following contact between patrilineal and matrilineal groups, although 
there are no clues to assert it. Nevertheless, the absence of  a strict unilinear descent 
enables matrimonial relationships to be established and maintained among groups whose
55 Nakane, 1967.
56 The Shillong Times, 6 feb 2008.
57 KHADC 1997: 3(c).
58 Gurdon 1907: 76; Lamare 2005: 19.
59 Cf. Nakane 1967: 131 and Nongkynrih 2002: 51.
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ethnicity is – really or ideally – associated with distinct modes of  descent.
One of  the most striking manifestations of  the weakness of  ethnic 
compartmentalization in Ri-Bhoi is the trans-ethnic phratries. Exogamic phratries exist 
in the Khasi social system, where they result either from the association of  two clans (teh
kur) or from the adoption of  a child (ting kur).60 In Ri-Bhoi, phratries comprise clans that
are perceived to belong to different ethnicities. It is not always clear whether the entities 
involved are descent groups or patronymic groups. Some claim to be of  the same clan 
(kh. shi kur), stemming from the same apical Grandmother, (Iawbei-tynrai), others claim 
they belong to distinct clans which "amalgamated" (teh kur) and thus became exogamous.
The social implications are the same however: that some individuals simultaneously 
claim a different ethnicity and a kinship relation of  a kind that will forbid them to marry.
This involves much more than the bearers of  homophonic titles. While it is not 
surprising that Muktieh (Khasi)61 and Mithi (Tiwa) are exogamous, what about the other 
components in the same phratry: Lumphuid (Tiwa/Bhoi), Ingti (Karbi), Syngkli (Bhoi), 
Kurbah (Khasi), Majaw (Khasi) and Basaiawmoit (Khasi)? Some informants describe the
relationship between these names as a relation of  "equality", for example: Khwait 
(Bhoi)=Khymdeit (Bhoi)=Malang (Tiwa)=Mayong=Markhap 
(Bhoi/Khasi)=Muksher=Solen. There are thought to be a dozen phratries in Ri-Bhoi, 
which would include most region-specific patronymics. 
As in the case of  ambilineal descent, it is difficult to assert that there exists a 
determinist link between migrations and trans-ethnic phratries. These could be seen as 
mutations of  Khasi and Tiwa phratries, which would have lost their ethnic belonging as 
a consequence of  "local globalization". However, I think it reasonable to allege that they 
are rather the remnants of  an old social system dissociating ethnicity and descent.
The multi-ethnicity of  phratries and matrimonial networks might have extended well 
beyond the actual areas where it has survived. It might have been associated with a 
human geography characterized by high mobility and the interlacing of  village networks. 
The village network is a general feature of  settlement organisation in this region, 
whether in a multi-ethnic or mono-ethnic environment. The raid is a true network, since,
as we have seen, its inhabitants claim they all come from the same "great village". 
Similarly, certain particular raids are considered as "elders", as original sites from where 
other raids emerged, such as Iapngar for the raids of  north-east Ri-Bhoi. The situation is 
similar in the Jaintia hills, where villages fall into two different categories: shnong barim, 
ancient villages, and shnongbri, farm-villages which stemmed from the former. How is an 
ancient village in fact different? It has a lyngdoh priest and it houses the matrilineage 
deities, which means that people from farm-villages have go to their native village to 
worship them.62 A very similar arrangement is found in the Tiwa hills. Each Tiwa 
perceives himself  and is perceived by others as belonging to one of  the seven major 
villages, krai baro. These are the only "true" villages, those that have a loro priest. They are
supposed to be the oldest settlements, although this is not always the case due to various
60 Gurdon, 1907: 78. Cf. Nongkynrih 2002: 41 on these associations. Phratries also exist among the Tiwas, where their 
composition is institutionalized.
61  When available, we indicate in brackets the ethnic identity commonly asserted by these title bearers.
62 Chattopadhyay 1988: 69.
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divisions and mergers. Villages without loro are called kunji phara or pham, "extensions", 
and each of  them is linked to a founding village.63 The largest network centred around 
Bormarjong village links sixteen settlements straddling Meghalaya and Assam. 
Finally, the traditional Karbi political system relies on a sophisticated fabric of  village 
networks. Ronghang, Chingthong and Amri, which are considered to be the three 
original geographical cradles of  the Karbis, each come under the jurisdiction of  four, 
three and two councils of  dignitaries respectively, who act as judges and supervise rituals
for a set of  villages.64 These functionaries reside in a sacred village, which definitely 
evokes the Khasi nongbah although it is not considered to be a founding village. At the 
lower levels, villages are organized into complex clusters (longri) governed by a hierarchy 
of  local chiefs (habe) emanating from specific clans. The spatial distribution of  village 
clusters does not follow a simple juxtaposition, but often a series of  interweavings.65 
Since the eighteenth century at least, the Jaintia political domination has certainly 
contributed to the modelling of  Karbi as well as Tiwa supra-village structures. A sign of  
this influence may be found in similarities between the titles of  functionaries in the 
Jaintia, Tiwa, Karbi and Bhoi areas.66 Whether they have been imposed by the Jaintia 
State or inspired by a common model, these institutions are obviously related to each 
other by a common “politico-ritual culture”– Leach would have spoken of  a “ritual 
language”.67 Ethnic revivalism has not uprooted them and, on the contrary, they have 
found a new legitimacy in Karbi-Anglong Autonomous District. As a matter of  fact, 
these ancient political structures are not based on "Karbi", "Tiwa" or "Khasi" principles,
but on the tribal principle of  local power-sharing by descent groups. 
Conclusion
The new territories of  North-East India are being created on an ethnic basis. The 
ideal model pursued is clearly an ethnically and culturally homogenous Nation-State. 
Ethnic polities which have been established, or are sought after, are supposed to stem 
from timeless spatial sovereignties. Without judging the legitimacy of  these claims, it is 
worthwhile noting that many local data point to models which are the opposite of  such 
representations. In several areas of  the North-East, local communities are not the subset
of  a particular ethnicity, but association of  lineages asserting various ethnicities or none 
at all. As a matter of  fact, these local communities look upon themselves as small multi-
ethnic nations. If  such societies represent relics, this would mean that in part of  North-
East India at least, the States had no strict ethnic basis, that a change of  ethnicity was 
common and that ethnicity itself  was not compulsory. If, on the contrary, we are dealing 
with the product of  a recent intermingling of  populations, then it must at least be 
admitted that the boundaries between ethnic groups are far less firmly rooted that we 
63 The term pham certainly has a link with the Assamese pam: "land newly occupied at a distance from home" (Hemkos 
2006: 676).
64 Interestingly enough, the head of  each council is called lindok and has many functions in common with the "Khasi" 
lingdoh.
65 For a short discussion on the Karbi political system, see Ramirez 2007: 99-101.
66 Beyond lingdoh/lindok: doloi, pator, basan, sangot. Some of  these terms look Indo-Aryan, but are not easily traceable in 
Assam or Bengal.
67  Leach, 1954: 101-102.
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generally suspect.
The perception of  ethnicity depends both on the spatial point of  view and on the 
spatial focus. Seen from the centre, like Shillong for the Khasi hills, one may feel that 
people sharing the same ethnic identities correspond to obvious cultural entities, with 
geographical cohesion and a historical depth. Yet as one gets closer to the margins, 
heterogeneity grows in linguistic as well as cultural and identity fields, though in various 
forms and on different scales. This does not mean that the anthropological landscape is 
amorphous. Distinctions emerge among different configurations of  multi-ethnicity, for 
example in the contrast between mixed villages and mosaics of  mono-ethnic villages. 
Nonetheless, anthropological territories, whatever their definition, rarely coincide with 
current political territories. As ethnic groups, the Karbis, Khasis and Tiwas are present in
significant numbers on both sides of  the border between an "officially Khasi territory" 
and an "officially Karbi territory".
Can the idiosyncrasies of  these areas be explained by their location on the margins of
major and clearly identifiable political and cultural poles? In this case, they would be 
mere transitional areas, zones of  compromise, of  mingling, where specificities become 
blurred. This would in itself  be a finding that would run counter to the very common 
image of  a compartmentalized cultural landscape. However, it would be necessary to 
explain why this transition zone does not take the shape of  a regular continuum and 
how the discontinuities appeared: migrations, ethnic and religious conversions, political 
conquest, economic change... The local representations of  history lead us on to another 
track, that of  a true "marginal" space, where cultures, identities and State authority 
constantly undergo a redefinition, a space which the "Three Kings" or "Three Borders" 
metaphor does indeed effectively illustrate. Much more than a space of  contested 
ethnicities or of  deculturation, the Three Borders would be one of  the last portions of  a
multi-ethnic and multicultural space caught nowadays between the conquering territories
of  States and ethnicities.68 
The anthropological situation prevailing at the Three Borders almost represents a 
counter-model opposed to the ethnic exclusivism which has affected North-East India 
over the last four decades. This movement has materialized in the form of  new political 
territories, the States and Autonomous Districts. Yet if  my presumptions are right, 
ethnicization has also transformed the perception of  the territories inherited from the 
past. Ancient polities are increasingly represented as historical manifestations of  the 
spatial rights of  such or such an ethnicity. As formulated by Hobsbawm, Gellner or 
Smith,69 the ruling elite imposes or inspires a cultural model among the dwellers of  a 
territory so that finally they perceive themselves as part of  a single body. 
If  we take the Three Borders as a testimony of  the past, the recent spatial 
compartmentalization has brought about another rupture: the territories that are being 
imposed consist of  continuous spaces. Here also, social representations have been 
largely conditioned by the Nation-State model. According to this model, polity might be 
68  This model would be the multi-ethnic version of  the “bridge & buffer” model by which Roy Burman (1994 : 81-
91) explains the formation of  tribal groups.
69 Hobsbawm 1983: 1-14, Gellner 1986, Smith 1986: 77.
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conceptualized only as a space, not as a network. And it would only be a continuous 
space, i.e. not intersecting with other spaces on the same scale. We have seen that several
present-day societies in the area are still organized – or were organized not so long ago –
on the basis of  interwoven village networks. This form of  organisation is incompatible 
with the administrative grid of  modern States, which require linear and tight limits. 
When such grids are imposed, networks are being severed by new boundaries – as 
happened on the Meghalaya-Assam border – creating enclaves which the States are 
striving to reduce.70 Paradoxically, if  Ri-Bhoi margins carry the remains of  vanished 
multi-ethnic societies, they also inspire a vast meta-tribal process which may be detected 
nowadays in matrimonial networks. Inter-ethnic marriages illustrate developments which
go counter to ethnicization and which may provoke its complete redefinition. In the near
future, they may design new social entities, both egalitarian and endogamous, 
transcending the ethnic and territorial compartmentalisation imposed by ethno-
nationalisms. Finally, the discovery of  these political forms, both archaic and modern, 
prompt us to reconsider the way North-East Indian societies have been approached so 
far, starting with the ethnic group.71
70 The nationalities policy in the USSR provides an interesting point of  comparison. With the aim of  taking into account 
the spatial imbrications of  ethnicities in the Caucasus, territorial enclaves were multiplied. Cf. Hirsch, 2005: 145; Martin 
2001.
71 Striking parallels may be drawn with the tribal zones of  Pakistan and Myanmar: "Using self-identification as the critical 
criterion of  ethnic identity, it should thus be perfectly possible for a small group of  Pathans to assume the political 
obligations of  membership in a Baluch tribe, or the agricultural and husbandry practices of  Kohistanis, and yet continue
to call themselves Pathans." (Barth 1970: 24); "Generally speaking, the perennial nature of  the clans and lineages from 
the colonial period up to now contrasts with the reification of  ethnicity involved both in the process of  Christianisation 
and in the contemporary pan-kachin movement..." (Robinne, 2007: 284). 
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